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HE views expressed in this article are solely the views of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of the Attorney
General of Texas.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the City of Addison, Texas became a party to litigation involving
its issuance of a permit for the sale of aviation fuel at the Addison Municipal
Airport. I As the lawsuit encountered the traditional twists and turns of liti-
gation, the trial judge ordered the parties to submit the dispute to a form of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR).2 Specifically, the court ordered the
parties to engage in a non-binding mediation process described in the Texas
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act.3
The Texas statute does not explicitly grant a trial court authority to order
authorized party representatives to participate, but such a requirement is
typical and is usually deemed critical to creating a dynamic mediation ses-
sion. 4 Citing the statute, the judge ordered that "each corporate party must
Ed. note: With the authors' concurrence, SMU LAW REVIEW invited a response to this arti-
cle, which is published in this issue. See Thomas S. Leatherbury and Mark A. Cover, Keeping
Public Mediation Public: Exploring the Conflict Betweeen Confidential Mediation and Open
Government, 46 SMU L. REv. 2221 (1993).
* First Assistant Attorney General, State of Texas. B.A. 1978, Yale University; J.D.
1981, Harvard Law School.
** Partner, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P. Austin, Texas. B.A. 1982, University of Texas at
Austin; J.D. 1985, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
1. Hedrick Beechcraft, Inc. v. Addison, No. 91-14996-K (Dist. Ct. of Dallas County,
192nd Judicial Dist. of Texas, Sept. 8, 1992).
2. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.023-027 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
ADR ordinarily refers to the use of a neutral third party to facilitate settlement of a dispute
outside of a formal court of law. The most common ADR techniques are mediation, mini-
trial, moderated settlement conference, summary jury trial, and non-binding arbitration.
3. Order of Referral for Mediation, April 16, 1992, by the Honorable Merrill Hartman,
Judge, Hedrick Beechcraft (No. 91-14996-K) [hereinafter Order]; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 154 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
4. See Order, supra note 3 (including rules for mediation emphasizing the need to have
persons with the power to settle a dispute present at the mediation).
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be represented by an executive officer with authority to negotiate a settle-
ment."5 The Addison City Council members balked. The ADR statute pro-
vides that all proceedings are confidential and privileged from disclosure; the
statute additionally provides that the mediator is prohibited from disclosing
anything, even to the appointing court, that transpires during the process,
including the conduct and demeanor of the parties.6 Mediation is secret;7
increasingly, governmental processes are not.
Literal compliance with the court's order would cause the Addison City
Council to violate another Texas statute, the Open Meetings Act.8 The di-
lemma of the Addison City Council crystallizes a concern of many in the
application of ADR techniques to controversies involving governmental en-
tities and the public interest. Some have argued that the ADR movement is
on a collision course with the trend supporting open government. 9 Critics
reason that ADR defeats the interests of open government.10 Specifically,
these critics offer several arguments. First, "ADR deprives the courts of the
ability to articulate constitutional values, set precedent, and develop gov-
erning rules."'" Second, ADR fails to produce a published, public opin-
ion. 12 Third, ADR promotes two-tiered justice, where the rich obtain high-
quality dispute resolution, and the poor are left to the court system or high-
volume, low-quality, court-annexed arbitration. 13 Fourth, ADR defeats the
public's expectation and "right" to know how the parties decided the out-
come of litigation involving social welfare, the environment, and civil
5. Id.
6. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.053 (Vernon Supp. 1993) ("[A]lI matters,
including the conduct and demeanor of the parties and their counsel during the settlement
process, are confidential and may never be disclosed to anyone, including the appointing
court.").
7. See STANDING COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, LEGISLA-
TION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 277 (1990).
A crucial aspect of any mediation is the freedom which participants have to say
what they want and not fear that what transpires during mediation will be later
used against them. It is thought that without an assurance of confidentiality,
disputants will be unwilling to mediate, or else may be reluctant to fully partici-
pate. For these reasons, courts have recognized the importance of protecting
the confidentiality of ADR sessions.
Id.
8. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
9. See Ronald L. Beal, The Clash of the Open Meetings Act and APTRA: A Tragedy in
the Making, 55 TEX. B.J. 928 (1992).
10. Jennifer Riggs, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Other Informal Settlement Tech-
niques in Agency Proceedings (Sept. 24-25, 1992) (unpublished paper presented at the Ad-
vanced Administrative Law Course in Austin, Texas). Riggs states, "[I]n fact, the whole idea
of the resolution of public disputes by a state agency's use of ADR procedures runs contrary to
the policies of open government." Id at D3.
11. Melinda Ostermeyer, Summary of Panel Presentations, in EMERGING ADR ISSUES IN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 24 (Frank E. A. Sander ed., 1991). "[T]he use of ADR may
cause different standards around the country. [Richard Stewart] contended that liability
should be determined by the courts, so that compliance with statutes is uniform and consis-
tent." Id. at 28.
12. Private Dispute Resolution Systems: Advancing Justice or Hindering It?, ADVANCING
JUST. UPDATE, Fall 1989 (summarizing Michele Herman's view).
13. Id.
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rights. 14 Fifth, ADR eliminates the impetus for change in the current public
court system. 15 Sixth, ADR limits the opportunity for public reaction and
input during the resolution of disputes. 16 Seventh, ADR introduces issues of
accountability where ADR services are private and the interests are public. 17
Finally, and most significantly, ADR produces an inferior quality of
justice. i8
These concerns are unavailing. ADR qualitatively and quantitatively of-
fers the participants in public policy disputes a better means of issue resolu-
tion than the current system. This article addresses each of the concerns
raised and concludes that alternatives to litigation serve the public interest
and are consistent with the public's growing and legitimate demand for open
government and accountability.
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF CIVIL JUSTICE IS BROKEN
The public lacks confidence in our civil justice system. 19 This lack of con-
fidence has its roots in many different areas. The concern may arise from a
perceived failure of a bureaucratized judiciary to address the personal and
emotional issues unique to domestic relations, from the perception that the
system is incapable of adjudicating relatively straightforward contract dis-
putes in a timely manner, or from the idea that the system seems to be
designed to maximize inefficiency and the profits of lawyers. 20 In any case,
public dissatisfaction cannot reasonably be disputed, nor is it wholly without
justification. Our courts have been unable to "keep pace with the public's
demand for prompt justice at a reasonable cost."' 21 The public perceives that
14. Id. (summarizing Leonard M. Ring's view).
15. Id. (summarizing Herman's view).
16. David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, Three Ethical Issues in Negotiation, 2 NEGOTI-
ATION J. 363, 368 (1986). "It is often easy to 'solve' the negotiation problem for those in the
room at the expense of those who are not." Id. "Another line of criticism describes dispute
resolution programs as interfering with the public notice benefits of consumer lawsuits and
their potential to stimulate major reform campaigns." NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A.
McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 219 (1989).
17. Cf MICHAEL J. KEATING, JR., PUBLIC ENDS AND PRIVATE MEANS: ACCOUNTA-
BILITY AMONG PRIVATE PROVIDERS OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, (1985) (discussing the
problem of accountability arising from privatization of public social services).
18. See Harry T. Edwards, Hopes and Fears for Alternate Dispute Resolution, 21 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. 425, 438-40 (1985); Eleanor H. Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Pro-
cess, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 499 (1989).
19. Thomas C. Fischer, Toward Legal Gridlock?, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 697, 697-99,
703-04 (1990). The public perceives a litigation crisis, whether or not the concern is justified.
Id. A 1987 Harris poll found that sixty-eight percent of Americans think that people bring
more lawsuits than they should. Id. at 703 (citing Louis HARRIS & ASSOC. STUDY No.
864014, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND TORT LAW REFORM
21-24 (1987) (available from Louis Harris & Assoc., 630 5th Ave., New York, New York
10111)). Fewer than one-half of those polled thought that the perceived litigation explosion
was due to an increase in the number of dangerous products, a greater understanding by citi-
zens of their legal rights, or population growth. Id. at 704.
20. Id. at 706 (stating that many people blame the "contingent fee system" for stirring up
massive amounts of litigation).
21. Frank G. Evans & Robyn F. Galerston, Private Judging in Texas: A 21st Century
Solution to Litigation Costs, 10 CORP. COUNS. REV. 43, 44 (1991).
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most court dockets are in fact backlogged 22 and that the length of time to
trial is often measured in years, not in days, weeks, or even months. An-
other concern is the expense of a litigation system in which a litigant need
not be poor to be unable to afford a lawyer. Further, concern about a civil
justice system in which parties who can afford to litigate win, and parties
who cannot afford to litigate lose, is not completely without merit.23
Regardless of culpability, this failure on the part of the current legal sys-
tem matters particularly in the context of public policy dispute resolution.
The public recognizes that the same rules of evidence and procedure are
applied to lawsuits concerning legislative apportionment, environmental pro-
tection, public school finance, and prison overcrowding, by the same lawyers
and judges with the same crowded dockets as suits concerning common civil
disputes. Assuming that restoration of public confidence in the outcome of
public policy disputes is a desirable goal, a more general climate of apprecia-
tion for our civil justice system is imperative.
At least three reforms can meaningfully improve both the flaws in the
system and the public's attitude toward the system and the legal profession.
Requiring the delivery of pro bono publico services, or at least meaningfully
increasing the availability of free or low cost legal services, is one solution. 24
Generic "civil justice reform," amending the rules of evidence and discovery
to reduce the complexity and the expense of routine litigation, is another
important step.25 The third and potentially most meaningful reform is the
development and availability of ADR.
22. One commentator has suggested "that by the early 21st century the federal appellate
courts alone will decide approximately [one] million cases each year. That bench would in-
clude over 5,000 active judges, and the Federal Reporter would expand by more than 1,000
volumes each year." John H. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567
(1975).
23. Jeffrey R. Pankratz, Neutral Principles and the Right to Neutral Access to the Courts,
67 IND. L.J. 1091, 1109 (1992) (stating that only those who can afford a lawyer have true
access to the courts which are designed to be operated by lawyers).
24. See Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854, 867(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that compelling an attorney to represent an indigent father
without compensation constituted a denial of equal protection of the law); In re Amendments
to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar - 1 - 3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial Admin. - 2.065 (Legal
Aid), 598 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1992) (addressing the issue of indigent legal services by approving a
voluntary pro bono program); In re Emergency Delivery of Legal Servs. to the Poor, 432 So.
2d 39 (Fla. 1983) (The petitioner urged the court to adopt rules imposing mandatory require-
ments on the Florida Bar members.); Victor Marreno, Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono:
Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services: Final Report to the Chief Judge of the
State of New York, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755, 756 (1991) (suggesting that all members of the
New York Bar be required to perform forty hours of pro bono work every two years).
25. See The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, ch. 23, §§ 471-482, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
104 Stat. 5090 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1992)) (Civil Justice Expense and
Delay Reduction Plan) (containing several elements that affect complex litigation); Box v.
Ameritrust Texas, N.A., No. 2; 92-CV-0089, 1992 WL 404286, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 29,
1992) (noting that the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas has implemented a Civil
Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990);
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA 11-13 (1991) (recommending fifty specific changes to the current civil litigation sys-
tem); BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING
COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION 8-29 (The Brookings Institution ed., 1989) (recom-
mending 12 specific procedural changes to the civil litigation system).
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III. MEDIATION AND THE RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC
POLICY DISPUTES
Non-binding mediation is an appropriate and, indeed, preferable alterna-
tive to traditional court system resolution in many public policy circum-
stances. We do not attempt to define or narrow what is meant by a "public
policy dispute"; others have done So. 2 6 However, it is critical to distinguish
traditionally binding forms of ADR, such as arbitration, from presumptively
non-binding ADR techniques like mediation. Non-binding mediation is the
only appropriate ADR process for resolution of most public policy disputes
and is the only technique contemplated by these authors. A binding dispute
resolution technique "delegates decision making to private individuals and
allows only limited governmental review."' 27 Non-binding mediation avoids
"serious constitutional challenge, because although private parties influence
the agencies' decisions, government officers retain final authority. '28
Although the primary purpose of this article is to advocate the use of
mediation to resolve public policy disputes and to address the associated
concern that confidential mediation sessions are a threat to open and public
government, it is first necessary to briefly address the various loosely-related
concerns previously outlined. 29 Most of these concerns result from confu-
sion over what the mediation process permits, and arise from a failure to
measure non-binding mediation against the only alternative of continued liti-
gation. For example, the most compelling and commonly-cited arguments
charge that advocates of ADR are motivated by self-interest 30 and label set-
tlement as "a capitulation to the conditions of mass society [that] should be
neither encouraged nor praised."'31 Attacking the motivation of ADR advo-
26. See SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W. J. D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES 3
(1988).
Disputes over public issues come in all sizes and shapes. They occur between
communities and their decision makers, between factions in government, be-
tween organizations, and between organizations and the public. Some conflicts
erupt into bitter confrontation and rapidly grow worse. Others are chronic dis-
agreements that flare up periodically, then die down and become dormant for a
time. . . . Conflicts that are splashed across the morning newspaper or per-
formed live on the evening news are so public and so political that they are hard
to resolve by non-adversarial means, but for every confrontation that reaches
national attention, there are thousands of smaller, less glamorous controversies
that cost people time, money, and anxiety and that readily lend themselves to
conflict management techniques.
Id.
27. Harold H. Bruff, Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbitra-
tion in Federal Programs, 67 TEX. L. REV. 441, 443 (1989).
28. Id.
29. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
30. See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986). "It appears that some people have joined the ADR bandwagon,
without regard for its purposes or consequences, because they see it as a fast (and sometimes
interesting) way to make a buck." Id. at 668.
31. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1075 (1984). Professor Fiss is
not opposed to ADR per se, but is against all forms of settlement:
I do not believe that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to judgment or
should be institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate basis. It should be
treated instead as a highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets. Set-
1993] 2211
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cates and arguing that disagreement is inherently better than agreement re-
flects cynicism and confusion within the judiciary, academia, and the legal
profession at-large about a revolutionary, yet simple, concept.
The absence of a written opinion or judgment does not distinguish a con-
flict resolved through non-binding mediation from most other cases.
Although various statistics are available, the overwhelming percentage of all
lawsuits filed in local, state and federal courts in the United States are set-
tled. 32 An even higher percentage of suits are resolved without a published
judicial opinion. 33 Given the anonymity assigned to the resolution of a ma-
jority of all disputes, it seems a bit disingenuous to criticize non-binding me-
diation for producing the same or similar results in a more timely, efficient,
less stressful, and less expensive fashion on the grounds that the process pre-
serves anonymity.
Critics of mediation inappropriately infer that the public is, in some fash-
ion, included in the process of dispute resolution absent mediation. 34 The
settlement of most disputes occurs, however, in a series of phone calls, let-
ters, meetings, or other events which, by necessity and practicality, are pri-
vate communications. Under virtually every set of rules of evidence and
procedure, such phone conversations, items of correspondence and discus-
sions are confidential and privileged. The public is not included even when
the subject of the dispute is public. Non-binding mediation, which is merely
the facilitation and the accommodation of a traditional series of communica-
tions, is thus falsely accused of being a process that excludes the public more
than traditional processes. The communication is confidential not because it
occurs in a structured - though usually informal - format, but rather be-
cause the communication pertains to a settlement negotiation of any kind.
Non-binding mediation is also erroneously blamed for removing public
disputes from any review by those representing the public interest. 35 With
regard to cases not requiring judicial review, mediation produces the same
tlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining: Consent is often coerced;
the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the absence of a trial
and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome.
Id.
32. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System - And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1212-13 (1992) ("Fewer than
10% of lawsuits require a trial for their resolution."); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J.
Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court System, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 532(1992) (stating that in the federal courts, 73% of all non-civil-rights cases settle); Evans &
Galerston, supra note 21, at 44 ("In nine out of ten cases, a settlement is reached before a full
trial on the merits."); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 25, at 7 (not-
ing that over 92% of civil lawsuits settled or otherwise disposed of before trial).
33. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Appellate Justice Bureaucracy and
Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 623, 632-40 (1988) (discussing the reasons for the in-
creased use of unpublished opinions); Lauren K. Robel, The Myths of the Disposable Opinion:
Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87
MICH. L. REV. 940, 955 n.74 (1989) (noting that 61% of federal appeals courts decisions were
unpublished).
34. See Private Dispute Resolution Systems, supra note 12 (summarizing Leonard M.
Ring's view).
35. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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result as a case settled without mediation. For the narrow category of cases
which require court approval, such as class actions and suits involving the
interests of minors, the interests and the practice of judicial review are still
assured. 36
Parties to mediation of public policy disputes traditionally recognize that
any negotiated settlement is contingent upon judicial, legislative, or even
public approval. For example, if litigants to a very public dispute over the
constitutionality of a state's funding of higher education were able to com-
promise and negotiate a settlement - either in the traditional fashion or
through the process of mediation - one condition of the settlement agree-
ment, presumably, would be legislative approval and adoption of the new
funding formula. A second condition of the agreement would be judicial
approval of the new formula's constitutionality. Third, the agreement could
be conditioned upon voter approval of any necessary constitutional referen-
dum. Though this hypothetical dispute involves a public policy issue in
which a settlement is problematic, it does not render a non-binding media-
tion process inappropriate.
Some have argued that ADR introduces issues of the accountability of the
private service provider (the mediator), which are particularly problematic
in the public arena.37 Accountability is an appropriate concern in any bind-
ing form of ADR. Binding arbitration has been the subject of contractual
agreement and judicial interpretation for years in labor-management dis-
putes, particularly when the public interest in preventing disruption in police
and fire protection services is at issue. 38 These cases highlight the problems
associated with the "delegation to 'outsiders' of the authority assigned by the
electorate to elected officials, who are subject to the checks and balances of
our governmental institutions:" '39
What is sound in the exercise of judicial power and the quasi-judicial
power of the grievance arbitrator, when applied to interest arbitration
in the public sector, is not consonant with a core concept of a represen-
tative democracy: the political power which people possess and confer
on their elected representatives is to be exercised by persons responsible
(not independent) and accountable to the people through the normal
processes of the representative democracy. 4°
Accountability issues in a non-binding mediation discussion, however, do
not differ from other accountability issues regarding private service provid-
ers who participate in rendering public services (for example, child day
36. See Ostermeyer, supra note 11, at 27. "Judges have the fundamental responsibility to
review all agreements and, if necessary, to conduct hearings to ensure that the agreement is fair
to all parties." Id. (stating the view of the Hon. Patricia Wald, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C.
Circuit).
37. Cf. KEATING, supra note 17, at 6 (discussing the problem of accountability arising
from privatization of public social services).
38. See Dearborn Firefighters Union v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. 1975);
Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 560 (Pa. 1969).
39. Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d at 233.




The concern raised by several commentators that ADR will promote "two
tiers" of justice is exemplified by highly theoretical efforts to measure the
"quality" of justice.42 The overriding problem with the "two tiers" objec-
tion is that it assumes that the wealthy do not already enjoy remarkable
advantages in obtaining the results they want in litigation.43 The principles
of "you get what you pay for" and "money talks," are principles that apply
to our current civil justice system. Non-binding mediation, as an alternative
to the continued litigation option, presents the best hope for the interests
traditionally, and increasingly, excluded from just resolution of disputes in
our judicial system.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY ADR DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE TEXAS OPEN RECORDS ACT
A. GENERAL RULE OF DISCLOSURE
The Texas Open Records Act requires that a governmental body make all
information available to the public unless that information is specifically ex-
empted from disclosure. 4
All information collected, assembled, or maintained by or for govern-
mental bodies, except in those situations where the governmental body
does not have either a right of access to or ownership of the informa-
tion, pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction
of official business is public information and available to the public dur-
ing normal business hours of any governmental body, with [certain enu-
merated] exceptions only .... 4
Twenty-two specific categories of information are exempted from disclosure
under the Act.4 6
B. GOVERNMENTAL BODIES DEFINED
Most municipal and state governmental bodies, as well as quasi-govern-
mental bodies, are subject to the disclosure requirements of the Open
Records Act.47 The Act does not, however, apply to the judiciary.48 Thus if
41. See KEATING, supra note 17, at 6.
42. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62
TUL. L. REV. 1 (1987); Edwards, supra note 30; Fiss, supra note 31; DAVID LUBAN, THE
QUALITY OF JUSTICE (Institute for Legal Studies Working Paper 8-6, 1988) (summarizing
issues raised at a workshop identifying and measuring quality in dispute resolution processes
and outcomes).
43. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 59-62 (1976).
44. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-563 (1990) (finding the Texas Guaranteed Student Loan
Corporation a "governmental body" within the meaning of the Open Records Act); Tex. Att'y
Gen. ORD-602 (1992) (finding the Dallas Museum of Art a "governmental body" under the
Act only to the extent it receives city and state financial assistance, and documents need only
be provided related to those museum activities that receive such assistance).
48. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 2(l)(H) (Vernon Supp. 1993); see Tex.
2214 [Vol. 46
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mediation is ordered, clearly indicating that the mediator serves under the
authority and direction of a court, a strong argument can be made that all
records received and stored by the mediator during the negotiation process
fall outside the scope of the Open Records Act. As a practical matter, the
mediator may choose not to maintain any records related to the
negotiations.
C. INFORMATION EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE
1. Matters Deemed Confidential by Other Law
Section 3(a)(1) of the Open Records Act protects from required public
disclosure, "information deemed confidential by law, either Constitutional,
statutory, or by judicial decision."'49 The scope of protection, therefore, is
determined solely by reference' to the express terms of confidentiality provi-
sions found outside the Act. Statutory confidentiality must, however, be
express. 50
Numerous Texas statutes provide confidentiality. Section 34.08 of the
Texas Family Code prohibits public disclosure of child abuse and neglect
investigations carried out by the Department of Human Services and main-
tained in the department's licensing files. 5' The Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act exempts "education records" from disclosure. 52 Executive
sessions authorized under the Open Meetings Act 53 also appear to be exempt
from the Open Records Act. In Open Records Decision No. 330, the Attor-
ney General concluded that Section 2(g) of the Open Meetings Act, a section
authorizing an executive session, may be taken with Section 3(a)(1) of the
Open Records Act as authority for withholding a transcript of an executive
session, as long as the session was called and conducted in compliance with
the Open Meetings Act. 54 The Open Meetings Act was amended in 1987 to
provide expressly that the audio tape or certified agenda of a properly closed
session is confidential. 55
Att'y Gen. ORD-572 (1990) (Although Bexar County Personal Bond Program is a govern-
mental body subject to the Act, when investigating and preparing reports pursuant to TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.42, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1993), the program functions as an
arm of the court and information collected is exempt from disclosure.).
49. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
50. See Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-573 (1990) (finding that the evidentiary privilege accorded
information submitted to the Insurance Commissioner pursuant to section 11 of article 21.07-1
of the Texas Insurance Code does not render such information confidential for purposes of the
Open Records Act).
51. See Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-587 (1991).
52. See Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-539 (1990) (finding that portions of a tape recorded inter-
view between officials of Texas A&M University and a former student concerning the student's
recruitment by the university and the student's attendance exempt from disclosure).
53. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
54. See Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-330 (1982).
55. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2A(h) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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2. Attorney-Client Privilege and Court Order
Records falling within the traditional concept of the attorney-client privi-
lege also are excepted from the Open Records Act:
[m]atters in which the duty of the Attorney General of Texas or an
attorney of a political subdivision, to his client, pursuant to the Rules
and Canons of Ethics of the State Bar of Texas are prohibited from
disclosure, or which by order of a court are prohibited from disclosure
56
This exception contains two different components: protection of the attor-
ney-client privilege and recognition of protection from disclosure granted by
court orders.
3. Litigation Exception
The Open Records Act contains a "litigation exception":
information relating to litigation of a criminal or civil nature and settle-
ment negotiations, to which the state or political subdivision is, or may
be, a party, or to which an officer or employee of the state or political
subdivision, as a consequence of his office or employment, is or may be
a party, that the attorney general or the respective attorneys of the vari-
ous political subdivisions has determined should be withheld from pub-
lic inspection . . . . 57
This exception authorizes governmental bodies to deny requests for informa-
tion relating to pending or "reasonably anticipated" litigation involving a
governmental entity or its officers or employees as well as information relat-
ing to settlement negotiations involving such litigation.58 While Section
3(a)(7) of the Act protects communications within the attorney-client privi-
lege from disclosure under the Open Records Act, that provision does not
exempt attorney work product from disclosure. Such information may be
exempted from disclosure under the Section 3(a)(3) "litigation exception" if
the requirements of that section are met.59
D. THE ACT'S DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS Do NOT CONFLICT WITH
THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF ADR
The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides, in relevant part:
56. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Since not
all communications between attorney and client contain client confidences or attorney advice,
not all communications are privileged. See Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-589 (1991) (finding that
attorney fee bills may be withheld under section 3(a)(7) of the Act only if they reveal client
confidences or attorney advice).
57. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
58. See Heard v. Houston Post Co., 684 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-588 (1991) (finding that information related to a
contested case before an administrative agency is "information relating to litigation" within
section 3(a)(3) of the Open Records Act).
59. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-574 (1990) (overruling Open Records Decision No. 304 (1982)
to the extent that it conflicts with this decision); see Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-575 (1990) (Work
product, investigative, or other "discovery privileges" must qualify under the "litigation excep-
tion" of section 3(a)(3) of the Act or must otherwise be disclosed.).
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Unless the parties agree otherwise, all matters, including the conduct
and demeanor of the parties and their counsel during the settlement
process, are confidential and may never be disclosed to anyone, includ-
ing the appointing court.60
Any record made at an alternative dispute resolution proceeding is confiden-
tial. The participants or the third party facilitating the procedure may not
be required to testify or be subject to process requiring disclosure of confi-
dential information in any proceedings relating to the dispute.6 1
The parties to public policy ADR may agree that certain information dis-
cussed be disclosed to the public in order to enhance the prospects for legis-
lative or executive approval of the negotiated settlement. 62 Furthermore, in
the likely event that the information discussed would be discoverable by the
participants or third parties independent of the ADR communication, the
information is not subject to the statutory confidentiality requirements. 63 To
the extent that information is within the scope of the ADR confidentiality
statute, however, that information is expressly exempted from the disclosure
requirements of the Open Records Act.64 Additionally, a second basis for
disclosure exemption exists for information that comes from a source that is
confidential pursuant to other laws.65 Finally, when public policy ADR is
ordered by the judiciary or is conducted with an eye toward litigation, the
disclosure requirements of the Open Records Act do not apply.66
V. MEDIATION OF PUBLIC POLICY DISPUTES IS NOT
PRECLUDED BY THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT
A. GENERAL RULE OF THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT
The Texas Open Meetings Act generally requires that "every regular, spe-
cial, or called meeting or session of every government body shall be open to
the public." 67 The "quorum" necessary to conduct such a meeting requires
a majority of the governmental body unless otherwise provided by law.68
B. "GOVERNMENTAL BODIES" SUBJECT TO THE ACT
The state and local governmental bodies subject to the Texas Open Meet-
ings Act are defined as broadly as possible and include any "deliberative
body having rule-making or quasi-judicial power."' 69 As with the Open
Records Act, the Open Meetings Act does not extend to the judicial branch
60. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
61. Id. § 154.073(b).
62. Id. § 154.053(c).
63. Id. § 154.073(c).
64. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (exempting
"information deemed confidential by law, either Constitutional, statutory, or by judicial
decision").
65. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.08 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (applying to child
abuse/neglect investigations by Department of Human Services).
66. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, §§ 3(a)(3), (a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
67. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
68. Id. §§ l(a), (d).
69. Id. § I(c).
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of government. 70 As an example of the broad application of the Act to gov-
ernmental bodies, the Act was amended effective January 1, 1992, to ex-
pressly apply to non-profit water or wastewater districts under Article 1434a
of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes.7'
C. EXEMPTIONS FROM OPEN MEETINGS ACT
The Open Meetings Act exempts from its provisions a number of different
types of meetings and communications, including closed or executive meet-
ings or sessions, attorney-client communications, settlement offers, and
meetings to evaluate, appoint, discipline, or dismiss a public officer or em-
ployee. 72 A few important exceptions to the Act follow.
1. Closed or Executive Meetings Sessions
The Open Meetings Act authorizes closed or executive sessions or meet-
ings to address any of the subject matters otherwise exempted under the
Act. 73 Before a closed or executive meeting may be held, a quorum of the
governmental body must first convene in an open meeting, publicly an-
nounce the intended closed meeting and specify the section or sections of the
Act that allow for the closed session. 74 Any interested person may then seek
an injunction or writ of mandamus for the purpose of preventing or revers-
ing a violation of the Act.75
2. Litigation Exception
Section 2(e) of the Act provides that:
[p]rivate consultations between a governmental body and its attorney
are not permitted except in those instances in which the body seeks the
attorney's advice with respect to pending or contemplated litigation,
settlement offers, and matters where the duty of a public body's counsel
to his client, pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility of the
State Bar of Texas, clearly conflicts with this Act.76
The Texas Attorney General has held that an administrative agency may
conduct proceedings involving disputed claims of privilege or confidentiality
of documents in camera in contested administrative proceedings. 77 The At-
torney General based his decision upon an exception to the Open Meetings
Act found in the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act.78 The
Attorney General held that "the contested case procedural requirements in
the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act ... creates an excep-
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
73. Id. § 2(a).
74. Id.; see Rogers v. State Bd. of Optometry, 619 S.W.2d 603, 606, (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1981, no writ).
75. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
76. Id. § 2(e).
77. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-645 (1987).
78. Id.; see also TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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tion to the Texas Open Meetings Act with regard to contested cases."'79
D. THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE
CONFIDENTIAL ADR
The public policy ADR methodology contemplated by the authors in-
cludes a ratification process by the appropriate executive or judicial author-
ity. To the extent that the mediation is court-ordered, the Act does not
apply at all. 80 Outside the litigation context, the Open Meetings Act would
be implicated only by mediation attended by a majority of the governmental
body members.8 ' Even in that instance, however, the mediation could be
conducted as a closed meeting or session so long as proper notice is given
and the agenda descriptions do not threaten to violate the general rule of
confidentiality attending ADR. In fact, the agenda is only discoverable pur-
suant to court order in an action brought under the Act. 82
VI. PUBLIC POLICY ADR DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE
OPEN COURTS PROVISION OF THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION
Mediation of public policy disputes does not conflict with the open courts
provision of the Texas Constitution, which provides that "[all] courts shall
be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law."' 83 In Sax v. Vot-
teler84 the Texas Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine
whether or not the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution has been
violated. First, the litigant must have a "cognizable common law cause of
action that is being restricted." 85 Second, the restriction must be "unreason-
able or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the
statute."
'86
The Texas Supreme Court has utilized the Sax test often in passing upon
open courts complaints. In Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 87 the court deter-
mined that the two year statute of limitations on wrongful death actions does
not violate the open courts provision.88 In Lucas v. United States8 9 the
supreme court determined that a statutory ceiling on medical malpractice
damages did violate the open courts provision. 90 In LeCroy v. Hanlon9' the
court found that a statute providing that a portion of a court clerk filing fee
79. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-645 (1987).
80. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 1(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
81. Id. § 1(a),(c).
82. See id. §§ 2A, 3A; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.053 (Vernon Supp.
1993).
83. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
84. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
85. Id. at 666.
86. Id.
87. 787 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1990).
88. Id. at 355-57.
89. 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
90. Id. at 690.
91. 713 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1966).
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go to the state general revenue fund violated the open courts provision. 92
An argument can be made that mandatory mediation, by statute or court
order, as a prerequisite to bringing or trying a civil action constitutes a "re-
striction" on a cognizable common law cause of action. 93 It is unlikely,
however, that the supreme court would determine that any such restriction
is "unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of
the statute."'94
VII. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether the public policy dispute is the subject of pending
litigation or can be "reasonably anticipated" to be its subject, non-binding
mediation does not run afoul of the Texas Open Meetings or Open Records
statutes. The authors contemplate that any mediated resolution of a public
policy dispute ultimately will be reviewed by either a court, a legislative
body, the public, an executive authority, or a combination of the above. In-
formation that could be discovered independent of the mediated negotiations
themselves may be revealed to the reviewing body, and the parties to the
mediation simply must make a determination as to whether or not approval
of the negotiated settlement can be obtained while preserving the confidenti-
ality of matters that otherwise could not have been discovered by the parties.
Once the dynamics of a mediation have contributed to an agreement subject
to review, however, the interests of all parties, including those represented
by the reviewing body, should be sufficiently addressed to ensure, in most
instances, that the required approval will be obtained.
More sophistication and experience with ADR in the public arena, in en-
vironmental litigation, consumer litigation, and other areas involving the
public interest, will generate more acceptance of ADR throughout the legal
profession. Whether or not the profession, including the judiciary and
academia, thoroughly acknowledge the benefits of ADR, the public itself
will require the widespread application of ADR techniques to a whole range
of civil disputes.
92. Id. at 342.
93. See Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 691-92 (finding that a statute need not abolish a cause of
action in order to run afoul of the open courts provision).
94. Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 666; see Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-3 (1991) (opining that
Chapter 64 of the Texas Agriculture Code, requiring appealable arbitration of planting claims
between farmers and vegetable seed sellers as a prerequisite to a civil action, does not violate
the second prong of the Sax test).
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